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Abstract This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an
active driving force during Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating
relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural
variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic
and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of
rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit
ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the
possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling
prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.
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Introduction
Important lessons learned from the recent global financial crisis are that the
judgment of private rating agencies can have a huge impact on macroeconomic
outcomes—and that it can be utterly mistaken.1 Given these past failings concerning
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structured products on US mortgage loans, it would be surprising if market
participants again rely on the same rating agencies when assessing the default risks
of governments in the current European sovereign debt crisis. It could even be
cataclysmic if these sovereign debt ratings were driving government bond yields
irrespective of the development of the underlying economic fundamentals. This
would put the fate of entire nations into the hands of private agencies because bad
ratings, which are not in line with economic fundamentals, could be justified ex post
via self-fulfilling prophecies. Then, even innocent lambs could be turned into, and
treated like, pigs.
Given the importance of these issues for the stability of the European Monetary
Union (EMU) we elaborate on the role of rating agencies in the current sovereign
debt crisis, focusing on the so-called PIGS countries, i.e., Portugal, Ireland, Greece
and Spain. The question whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an
active driving force during Europe’s debt crisis is addressed in three steps. First, we
try to develop an understanding of how sovereign debt ratings are formed. We do
this by estimating relationships between ratings and macroeconomic and structural
variables. Second, we use these equations to decompose actual ratings into a
systematic and an arbitrary part, the latter being defined as what is left unexplained
by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we quantify the effect
of the systematic and the arbitrary part of a country’s sovereign debt rating on its
government bond yields to assess the endogenous and the discretionary impact of
rating agencies on market outcomes during the European debt crisis with special
concern for the PIGS countries. As our results suggest, the PIGS countries were not
only rated worse during the crisis than all other countries in our sample of 26 OECD
countries, but this markdown also resulted in significantly higher interest rates on
government bonds, which themselves aggravated the European debt crisis.
Our paper contributes to several strands in the literature. First, it adds to the broad
literature following Cantor and Packer (1996) that tries to explain sovereign debt
ratings, which is summarized by Mellios and Paget-Blanc (2006). Most closely
related to our study is the work of Ferri et al. (1999), Mulder and Perrelli (2001) and
El-Shagi (2010) who discuss the role of rating agencies during the Asian Crisis at the
end of the 1990s. By employing ordered regressions to explain sovereign debt
ratings, our analysis is also related to Hu et al. (2002), Block and Vaaler (2004) and
Afonso et al. (2007, 2009). It seems that no study exists which analyzes the role of
rating agencies during the current European sovereign debt crisis using such
methods. Our paper also adds to the literature that finds a significant impact of
ratings on government bond spreads. Following the work of Kamin and von Kleist
(1999) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000), who identified such a relationship for
developing countries in the 1990s, Gomez-Puig (2006) finds a negative relationship
between bond spreads and ratings for EMU members between 1996 and 2001. This
is consistent with the results that Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) obtained for EMU
countries between 1999 and 2008. More recent papers suggest this relation also
holds in the face of the current economic crisis, see for example Attinasi et al. (2009)
or Sgherri and Zoli (2009). We do not only contribute to this literature by explaining
government bond spreads with more recent sovereign debt ratings, but also by
conducting Granger causality tests on the causal relation between both variables,
which has rarely been done before.
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides information on the
employed data. Then we try to determine how sovereign debt ratings are built,
followed by a look at how ratings and their components affect sovereign credit
spreads. In the final section we offer concluding remarks.
The Data
Our empirical analysis uses annual data for 26 OECD countries for the period 1999
to 2010.2 Eight OECD members were omitted because no data was available or
membership started after 1999. We chose the specific period because sovereign
ratings for the observed countries are not always available before this, and because
we wanted to avoid the structural break due to the introduction of the Euro in 11
countries of our sample. The following variables are included, with descriptive
statistics shown in Table 13:
& Rating: Three major agencies provide sovereign ratings: Moody’s, Fitch and
Standard & Poor’s. We use the end-of-year, long-term sovereign debt rating of
Fitch, Inc.4 For non-ordered regressions we translate the ratings into an
equidistant numerical scale from 1 for D and 21 for AAA as, for example, in
Afonso et al. (2007).
& GDP growth: Data on real GDP growth is from the OECD Economic Outlook
No. 88 Annex Table 1.
& GDP per capita: Real GDP per capita measured in thousand current international
dollars is from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
& Government surplus: This variable measures general government financial
balances as a percentage of nominal GDP including one-off factors such as
sales of mobile phone licenses. The source is Annex Table 27 of the OECD
Economic Outlook No. 88.
& Government primary surplus (adj): This variable measures the general
government underlying primary balance as a percentage of GDP. It equals
Government surplus less net interest payments and is adjusted for one-off factors.
The source is Annex Table 30 of the OECD Economic Outlook No. 88.
& Government debt: General government gross debt as a percentage of nominal
GDP is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
& Government bond yield: Daily 10-year government bond yields are from
Thomson Reuters Datastream. We use annual averages (avg) and end-of-year
values (eoy).5
2 Our sample includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the USA.
3 Data for 2010 are mostly estimates provided by the OECD Economic Outlook or the IMF World
Economic Outlook database.
4 Since the data needed for our analysis were not available for all three agencies we settled for Fitch as a
representative. Given the high correlation between the ratings of Fitch and Standard & Poor’s we do not
expect this choice to bear on our main results.
5 Due to the high volatility of daily data we used December averages instead of the December 31st value
for the end-of-year values.
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& Credit spread: The credit spread is calculated as the difference between the end-
of-year 10-year government bond yield of a country and of Germany.
& Inflation: The source is the IMF World Economic Outlook database.
PIGS or Lambs? Understanding Sovereign Debt Ratings
The main purpose of this section is to identify robust explanations of how agencies
may generate their ratings. We need these as benchmarks, since rating agencies
remain understandably secretive about their true procedures. These benchmarks
allow us to conclude whether ratings arbitrarily and significantly went off course
when the European sovereign debt crisis erupted.
This section, therefore, proceeds in two steps. First, we set up and estimate a
benchmark model that relates ratings to variables that are considered relevant for the
default probability of a sovereign state. Then we test the consistency of the PIGS ratings
during the European sovereign debt crisis with this estimated benchmark model.
The Benchmark Model
Whether a country has to default or not is ultimately determined by economic
fundamentals.6 In our benchmark model the rating Ri,t of country i in year t is
described by:
Ri;t ¼ a þ b0Xi;t þ ɛi;t ð1Þ
where: α denotes the intercept; β is a vector of coefficients; Xi,t is a vector of
economic fundamentals, including a dummy variable for members of the euro area;
and εi,t reflects an error term. The variables contained in the Xi,t vector are chosen
from the broad set of variables provided by the literature on sovereign debt ratings
Table 1 Individual sample descriptive statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum Obs.
Rating (eoy) 19.21 20.00 2.45 21.00 11.00 321
GDP growth 2.62 2.65 1.98 10.19 −3.80 324
GDP per capita 31.07 29.73 11.11 82.09 9.62 324
Gov. surplus −1.25 −1.45 5.04 19.26 −32.30 324
Gov. prim. surplus (adj) 0.05 0.44 2.91 6.88 −8.31 324
Gov. debt 58.52 53.16 35.10 225.85 6.07 324
Gov. bond yield (avg) 4.66 4.50 1.62 11.80 0.50 290
Gov. bond yield (eoy) 4.56 4.40 1.66 12.10 0.60 297
Credit spread (eoy) 0.70 0.30 1.68 9.10 −3.70 297
Inflation 2.46 2.28 1.83 12.41 −1.71 324
6 Note that this must not be confused with the question whether a country actually declares default or not,
see Eaton et al. (1986).
Role of Rating Agencies 291
by using economic reasoning underlying the theory of public debt. The first column
of Table 2 shows the estimation results obtained from a pooled OLS regression.
Seven out of eight variables turn out to be statistically significant at the 99 percent
confidence level and have the expected sign. It is not surprising that according to our
results agencies rate members of the Eurozone 0.85 notches higher than non-members.
Table 2 Explaining sovereign debt ratings
Dependent variable: Rating (eoy)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)+
Intercept 19.60 ***
(0.00)
19.59 ***
(0.00)
21.71 ***
(0.00)
–
Crisis – −1.00 ***
(0.00)
0.66 ***
(0.00)
−1.43 ***
(0.00)
PIGS – 0.03
(0.91)
– 0.21
(0.70)
PIGS×Crisis – −2.30 ***
(0.00)
−1.31 ***
(0.00)
−3.41 ***
(0.00)
Euro zone 0.87 ***
(0.00)
1.01 ***
(0.00)
– 2.39 ***
(0.00)
GDP growth −0.04
(0.48)
−0.17 ***
(0.01)
0.08 **
(0.03)
−0.31 ***
(0.01)
GDP per capita 0.12 ***
(0.00)
0.13 ***
(0.00)
0.01
(0.54)
0.27 ***
(0.00)
Gov. surplus 0.08 ***
(0.00)
0.04 *
(0.10)
0.15 ***
(0.00)
0.37 ***
(0.00)
Gov. prim. surplus (adj.) 0.10 ***
(0.01)
0.07 *
(0.08)
−0.20 ***
(0.00)
−0.30 ***
(0.00)
Gov. debt −0.02 ***
(0.00)
−0.02 ***
(0.00)
−0.03 ***
(0.00)
−0.03 ***
(0.00)
Lagged gov. bond yield (avg) −0.46 ***
(0.00)
−0.38 ***
(0.00)
−0.10 **
(0.04)
−0.45 ***
(0.01)
Inflation −0.31 ***
(0.00)
−0.39 ***
(0.00)
−0.07 **
(0.03)
−0.66 ***
(0.00)
Country fixed effects N N Y N
R
2
0.67 0.68 0.96 –
Predicted evaluation
(correctly classified)
0.27 0.28 0.78 0.56
Predicted evaluation
(at most 1 notch difference)
0.76 0.80 1.00 0.85
Observations 262 262 262 262
P-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level
Data for 26 OECD countries between 1999 and 2010 from OECD, IMF, Thomson Reuters and Fitch
Ratings
Ratings are transformed into an equidistant numerical scale from 1 (D) to 21 (AAA) in Regression (I) to
(III)
+ Results for regression (IV) are obtained by using an ordered dependent variable logit model
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This premium might be attributed to the belief that the Stability and Growth Pact may
have a positive impact on the budget discipline of Eurozone members.
To check the robustness of our results we also included several additional
variables suggested in the literature, such as real effective exchange rates and other
trade related measures. But since these variables only come into play when
sovereign debts are issued in foreign currency, they turned out insignificant in our
sample of industrialized countries. Also, the corruption index has no explanatory
power since almost all OECD countries are ranked similarly high with little variation
over time. In contrast, the composite index of government effectiveness issued by
the World Bank and used by Afonso et al. (2009) has a significant impact on
sovereign debt ratings. We decided not to incorporate this in our model, however,
since it is highly correlated with income per capita and, thus, contains little
additional information.7 We also did not include measures for a country’s default
history, as no country in our sample declared default after World War II.
PIGS and the Crisis – a Modified Model
The benchmark model tells us nothing about whether the PIGS countries were
singled out for special treatment during the crisis. To answer this question we modify
Eq. 1 such that:
Ri;t ¼ a þ b0Xi;t þ gCi;t þ dPi;t þ l Pi;t  Ci;t
 þ ɛi;t ð2Þ
where: Ci,t is a dummy variable for the years 2009 and 2010, when the sovereign debt
crisis unfolded; Pi,t is a dummy variable for the PIGS countries Portugal, Ireland,
Greece and Spain; and Pi,t×Ci,t is an interaction term of the crisis and the PIGS dummy.
The second column of Table 2 displays the results for this modified model by using
pooled OLS. Almost all previous variables remain significant at the same or a slightly
lower confidence level, whereas income growth now has a statistically significant
negative impact on sovereign debt ratings. This seems at odds with common economic
reasoning according to which higher income growth ceteris paribus leads to a lower
debt ratio in the future. Given our sample of relatively homogenous countries, this
negative regression parameter for income growth might be the result of some catch-up
effect. According to the convergence property inherent in neoclassical growth theory,
within a group of homogenous countries we would expect poor countries to feature
higher income growth than richer ones. Since we find positive effect of income levels
on sovereign ratings, this might explain the negative impact of income growth.8
Apart from that, two other results are noteworthy. First, the statistical significance
of the crisis dummy, Ci,t, deserves particular attention. According to our estimates,
the partial effect of the economic turmoil in 2009 and 2010 leads to a general rating
decline of one notch. This is surprising, given that ratings do not reflect objective
default probabilities but the relative creditworthiness of a country compared to others
(see Mellios and Paget-Blanc 2006). This means that others (i.e., developing
7 In fact, high values of government effectiveness seem to be a result rather than a cause of high income
levels, since this index comprises elements like the quality of infrastructure, public schooling or public
health care.
8 Afonso et al. (2009) also find a negative effect of income growth on sovereign debt ratings.
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countries not contained in our sample) must have been rated better during the crisis
to keep the average rating constant. Additionally, agencies claim their ratings to be
unaffected by changes in the business cycle (see Afonso et al. 2009), which makes
the significant negative coefficient of the crisis dummy even more puzzling.
Second, it is remarkable that the interaction term turns out to be highly significant but
the PIGS dummy is not. This means that even though there was no consequence of it
being part of the PIGS group before the start of the European sovereign debt crisis, tables
have turned over the last 2 years.When using the systematic from the benchmark model,
the rating for a PIGS country in 2009 and 2010 is 2.30 notches lower than that of a
hypothetical country, which is not part of that group but has the same economic
fundamentals. This result is similar to that of Ferri et al. (1999) who find that, given
their economic fundamentals, some countries were downgraded excessively by rating
agencies during the Asian Crisis of 1997–1998. Of course, following Mulder and
Perrelli (2001) one might point out that we cannot judge at that point whether the
change in the rating is a correct anticipation of what lies ahead. And certainly, these
countries were not grouped together arbitrarily, as they all face serious home-grown
economic challenges. However, given the sharp increase in this group, the threat they
are currently facing might be aggravated in an unjustified manner.
We conducted several robustness checks that give evidence for structural validity of
our estimates. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and bootstrapped
standard errors did not change our findings. Column 3 of Table 2 displays the results
when we control for country fixed effects.9 Here, the significance of the PIGS×Crisis
interaction term still reaches the 99 percent confidence level but with a smaller
absolute coefficient. Surprisingly, the regression parameter for the crisis dummy turns
positive in this case, which might be due to the high variance within the estimated
fixed effects. Thus, it seems like the downgrading of specific country ratings is
accompanied by an upgrading (or maintaining) of others, which is not justified by
economic fundamentals. Finally, taking into account the ordinal nature of sovereign
debt ratings we follow the approach of Hu et al. (2002) or Block and Vaaler (2004) by
performing an ordered logit regression (see Column 4 in Table 2). Again, the PIGS×
Crisis interaction term is negative and significant at a 99 percent confidence level. The
crisis dummy has a negative effect on the sovereign debt rating, as no fixed effects are
considered in this case, and the PIGS dummy again is insignificant.
Overall, our modified model fits the data very well and appears robust. A total of 80
percent of predicted sovereign debt ratings differ by no more than one notch from their
actual value. If fixed effects are used, 78 percent of all observations are correctly
predicted. Results suggest that ratings of countries in the PIGS groups have been
downgraded excessively during the crisis, unsupported by our identified explanation of
sovereign credit ratings that applied before the crisis and for other countries.
The Impact of Ratings on Credit Spreads
We now decompose actual ratings into a predicted part that can be attributed to
economic and structural variables and an unexplained or arbitrary remainder. Then
9 A Hausman Test strongly indicates the use of fixed effects rather than random effects.
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we estimate the influence of each part on the credit spread. As we shall see,
markets do respond to the arbitrary part, which indicates that rating agencies may
indeed exert a discretionary influence on the price that governments pay for
credit.
The underlying assumption of this approach, namely the causal effect of ratings
on credit spreads, has been frequently employed in the literature (e.g., see Cantor
and Packer 1996). Nevertheless, we test for Granger causality between the two
variables, focusing on the PIGS countries, in order to underscore the validity of this
assumption before we proceed to the regressions on credit spreads.
Ratings and Credit Spreads: The Question of Causality
Since looking for causal effects in financial markets makes little sense with annual
data, we work with weekly averages instead.10 To perform a Granger causality test
we first estimate a VAR using first differences of credit and rating spreads of each
country.11 First differences are sufficient to render ratings and credit spreads
stationary as an Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test indicates. The number of lags in the
VAR is determined by the Hannan-Quinn information criterion and is between five
and eight. The Granger causality test allows for an evaluation of the null hypothesis
that a variable is exogenous by computing the Chi-square (Wald) statistic for the
joint significance of the other lagged endogenous variable. For the PIGS countries
considered here, we can never reject the hypothesis that the credit spread is caused
by the rating spread. However, in two out of the four cases we can reject that the
rating spread is caused by the credit spread at reasonable confidence levels. These
results support the common conjecture that ratings, indeed, are a relevant variable
for explaining credit spreads.12
Note that we used lagged government bond yields to explain ratings in the
previous section. Doing so is not only an econometric remedy against endogeneity
but it is also a valid assumption from a theoretical point of view—the proper variable
in the regressions of the previous section is the effective interest rate a country has to
pay for all its current debt. This usually lags behind the current interest rate and is
closer to the lagged annual average due to different maturities and different issue
dates of a country’s debt titles.
The Effect of Ratings and their Constituent Parts on Credit Spreads
In this section, we decompose actual country credit ratings into a systematic part and
an arbitrary part. The systematic part is explained by our set of economic and
11 As mentioned before, the credit spread of a country denotes the difference between its government bond
yield and that of Germany. The rating spread denotes the difference between Germany’s rating and the
respective country’s rating. Since Germany obtains a AAA rating in all observations, the rating spread is
the distance of the current rating to the maximum rating.
12 Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) find similar results using Granger causality tests. However, they apply a
slightly different method and use different data.
10 We can do so since the underlying data series—government bond yields and sovereign debt ratings—
are available on a daily basis.
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structural variables in a fashion that appears robust over time and across countries.
The arbitrary part is what remains unexplained in this fashion. We then estimate the
impact of these components on the credit spread and thereby the capital costs of a
country.13 We use the credit spread instead of the interest rate to control for the
general, global interest rate that obviously varies over time and is not influenced by
idiosyncratic country ratings. We estimate the following model:
Si;t ¼ h R^Xi;t þ q R^PCi;t þ k ɛ^i;t þ mi;t ð3Þ
where: Si,t is the credit spread; μi,t is the error term; and R^
X
i;t, R^
PC
i;t and ɛ^i,t are the
decompositions of actual ratings, derived from the regressions given in Table 2. It
holds that:
Ri;t ¼ R^Xi;t þ R^PCi;t þ ɛ^i;t ð4Þ
with: Ri,t as the observed rating, R^
X
i;t ¼ a^ þ b^0Xi;t þ g^Ci;t þ d^Pi;t as the rating part
explained (mostly) by economic fundamentals, and R^PCi;t ¼ l^ Pi;t  Ci;t
 
as the
economically unjustified rating markup for PIGS countries during the crisis.14 The
residual ɛ^i,t is also used as an explanatory variable reflecting arbitrary rating markups
that are not part of the PIGS×Crisis markup.
Note that for each regression in Table 2 we get different estimates for the
decompositions because the coefficients a^; b^; g^; d^; l^ and the residual ɛ^i,t vary with
the specific set-up or method used in each regression. Our analysis, therefore,
considers each equation separately. An exception is the ordered dependent variable
regression. We abstain from decomposing the resulting equation because residuals
are not available and generalized residuals as in Becker and Kennedy (1992) cannot
be directly compared with those derived from the other regressions. We also refrain
from decomposing the fixed effects regression since bootstrapping cannot be applied
(see below). When decomposing the rating according to Regression (I) R^PCi;t cannot
be computed and R^Xi;t ¼ a^ þ b^0Xi;t only contains economic variables because the
respective dummy variables Pi,t, Ci,t and Pi,t×Ci,t are omitted in this case. Results are
given in Table 3. The first column shows a baseline estimation in which we regress
the credit spread on the observed rating only. Regression (ii-I) uses the decomposed
rating computed from Regression (I) in the previous section, (iii-II) and (iv-II) relate
to Regression (II).
The results suggest that rating agencies may indeed influence interest rates
with rating markups that cannot be attributed to economic fundamentals.15 All
estimates show that the rating markup for the PIGS countries during the crisis is
significant and increases the credit spread for these countries.16 Also, both the
systematic part of the rating, as well as the remaining arbitrary markup or residual,
turn out to be highly significant. In Regression (ii-I) the effect of the PIGS×Crisis
13 Both ratings and credit spreads are now end of year values.
14 Note that the rating markup for the PIGS countries during the crisis is always negative and actually
represents a markdown.
15 Or that rating agencies use a model that economic theory has not deciphered yet.
16 Note the negative coefficients: A markdown or negative markup therefore leads to higher credit spreads.
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markup is captured by the residual which increases the respective coefficient
slightly.
In (iv-II) we use the economic variables from Table 2 instead of R^Xi;t plus the
arbitrary rating markups R^PCi;t and ɛ^i,t. The latter ones still influence the credit
spread. Markets do not interpret economic variables in a way that would fully
explain the credit spread markup of the PIGS countries during the recent crisis. They
Table 3 The influence of decomposed ratings on credit spreads
Dependent variable: Credit Spread (eoy)
(i) (ii-I)+ (iii-II)+ (iv-II)+
Intercept 8.26 ***
(0.00)
8.74 ***
(0.00)
8.68 ***
(0.00)
−3.15 ***
(0.00)
Crisis – – – 0.90 ***
(0.00)
PIGS – – – −0.39 **
(0.02)
Euro zone – – – 0.00
(0.98)
GDP growth – – – 0.05
(0.26)
GDP per capita – – – 0.00
(0.65)
Gov. surplus – – – −0.01
(0.78)
Gov. prim.
surplus (adj)
– – – 0.01
(0.76)
Gov. debt – – – 0.00
(0.38)
Lagged gov. bond
yield (avg)
– – – 0.57 ***
(0.00)
Inflation – – – 0.29 ***
(0.00)
Rating (eoy) R −0.40 ***
(0.00)
– – –
Rating: Economic
fundamentals R^ x
– −0.42 ***
(0.00)
−0.42 ***
(0.00)
–
Rating: PIGS×Crisis markup RP×C – – −1.35 **
(0.03)
−1.62 **
(0.03)
Rating: Residual ɛ^ – −0.33 ***
(0.00)
−0.23 ***
(0.00)
−0.23 ***
(0.00)
R
2
0.34 0.34 0.38 0.78
Observations 262 262 262 262
P-values in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level
Data for 26 OECD countries between 1999 and 2010 from OECD, IMF, Thomson Reuters and Fitch Ratings
+ Two-stage bootstrap with 1000 replications; p-values and significance levels according to percentile method
Role of Rating Agencies 297
also use the arbitrary information R^PCi;t and ɛ^i,t given by the rating agencies. It is
noteworthy, however, that markets interpret economic variables differently than
rating agencies (only the lagged interest rate and inflation have a significant
influence on the current credit spread).17 Since (ii-I), (iii-II) and (iv-II) build on
generated regressors, we apply the bootstrapping method on these two-stage
regressions to obtain robust statistics.18
Conclusion
Our econometric exercise produced a structural explanation of sovereign credit
ratings that is robust with respect to the statistical methods employed. Based on these
estimated equations, we decomposed actual ratings into a systematic and an arbitrary
part. Figure 1 illustrates the procedure, using Ireland and the results of Regression (I)
as an example.
The solid line displays Ireland’s credit rating as predicted by economic and
structural variables alone. This is the systematic part of the credit rating. The dashed
line shows Ireland’s actual credit rating. The vertical difference between the two
lines is what we call the arbitrary component of the credit rating. The most striking
feature is the sudden and substantial increase of this arbitrary part in 2009 and 2010.
We then provided evidence that risk premiums in capital markets, represented by
credit spreads for government bonds, are affected not only by the systematic part of
credit ratings, but by the arbitrary part as well. This has the serious implication that
rating agencies do possess some power to drive countries with a significant debt
ratio into trouble. With respect to the group of PIGS countries, they appear to have
played, deliberately or not, just such an unfortunate role during the European
sovereign debt crisis that unfolded in 2009.
This result must be taken with a pinch of salt, of course, since it crucially depends
on the employed benchmark. This benchmark, the structural equation we identified
to explain the ratings of a major agency, may be close to what this agency actually
18 Compared to standard OLS, coefficients are virtually identical and significance levels are very much the
same. Only the significance level of the PIGS×Crisis markup drops slightly from 99% to 95% when
bootstrapping is applied.
17 Note that, as expected, the signs of the coefficients are opposite to the ones before, since higher credit
spreads match with lower ratings. Also note that including
_
RXi;t in this regression results in
multicollinearity, as expected.
Fig. 1 Ireland’s observed and
predicted ratings according to
Regression (I)
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does, or it may not, even though it explains its decisions rather well. But given that
Ferri et al. (1999) arrived at similar conclusions after the Asian crisis, and given the
unimpressive role that rating agencies played in the run-up to the US subprime crisis,
it would be naive and risky not to subject the issue raised in this paper to further and
closer scrutiny.
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